Natural justice is a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.
Genuine
Yes. In Principal Doctrines (270 BC), Principal Doctrines 31 (Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.150); translated by R. D. Hicks, 1925, as Sovran Maxims.
Found word for word by program in the Greek original and in R. D. Hicks’ English translation (1925).
- Work
- Principal Doctrines (Κύριαι Δόξαι), 270 BC
- Where
- Principal Doctrines 31 (Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.150); translated by R. D. Hicks, 1925, as Sovran Maxims
- Found at
- Paragraph 31 of the Greek text, 31 of the English
- Translation
- R. D. Hicks, 1925
Researched by AI; checked by program against the full text on 31 October 2026. Editorial review: pending. How we check
On the page
[…] Those natural desires which entail no pain when not gratified, though their objects are vehemently pursued, are also due to illusory opinion; and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the man’s illusory opinion.
[…] Ἐν αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, μὴ ἐπʼ ἀλγοῦν δὲ ἐπαναγουσῶν ἐὰν μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν, ὑπάρχει ἡ σπουδὴ σύντονος, παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὗται γίνονται καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν.
31. 150. Natural justice is a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.
[XXXI.] Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.
32. Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with one another, to the end that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. […]
[XXXII.] […]
33. There never was an absolute justice, but only an agreement made in reciprocal intercourse in whatever localities now and again from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.
[XXXIII.] Οὐκ ἦν τι καθʼ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλʼ ἐν ταῖς μετʼ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθʼ ὁπηλίκους δή ποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.
The scene
This maxim opens the collection’s sustained account of justice as a mutually useful arrangement against harm. The next discusses creatures and peoples unable or unwilling to make such covenants; maxim 33 denies a justice existing independently of agreements. Later maxims test laws by their usefulness in mutual dealings rather than by their name alone.
What it means
Justice rests on reciprocal benefit: an arrangement that protects people from harming one another.
Often misread
Expediency here is mutual advantage, not whatever benefits one powerful individual. Nor does the maxim identify every existing law as just: the later maxims explicitly ask whether a law actually serves useful mutual relations.
Topics
Related quotes
- There never was an absolute justice, but only an agreement made in reciprocal intercourse in whatever localities now and again from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.
- The just man enjoys the greatest peace of mind, while the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude.
- Happiness is a kind of working of the soul in the way of perfect Excellence Aristotle
- Happiness is the meaning and the purpose of life, the whole aim and end of human existence. (paraphrase) Aristotle
- Virtue is a mean state; but in reference to the chief good and to excellence it is the highest state possible. Aristotle
Sources
Cite it
Epicurus, Principal Doctrines (270 BC), Principal Doctrines 31 (Diogenes Laertius, Lives X.150); translated by R. D. Hicks, 1925, as Sovran Maxims, translated by R. D. Hicks (1925). Checked at Quotogeny, https://quotogeny.com/q/natural-justice-prevents-harming-and-being-harmed/ (31 October 2026).
Have a different wording, or a source we missed? Check it or submit it.
Do you hold the rights to anything on this page? Tell us.
Checked by people
People who checked this entry against its source, under their own names. Their checks do not change the verdict: an editor reviews every entry.
Comments